Creating surplus value from care: Control strategies used by platform intermediaries
By Paula McDonald, Penny Williams and Robyn Mayes
In the context of an ageing population and rising demand for care services, employment prospects for care workers are projected to grow. One response to this has been the emergence of digital platforms which ‘intermediate’ care work by facilitating connections between care workers and people requiring care.
Care platforms embrace features of the on-demand economy such as incentivizing responsiveness and worker flexibility (Ticona and Mateescu, 2018). They may provide self-employed workers with new opportunities to earn additional income, improve skills, or secure autonomy (Minifie, 2016). Critics argue however that the organization of platform work fragments work, de-skills professionals, and places downward pressure on pay rates (Graham et al., 2017; Schörpf et al., 2017).
Care platforms create surplus value through the contractual terms and conditions that workers must sign up to in order to access work via the platform. These terms offer an important window into the control strategies adopted by new business models in the digital economy.
Our study examined the terms and conditions of nine digital platform companies which intermediate disability and aged care in Australia. In contrast to many studies of digital platform work which focus on transport and food delivery, our research explored intermediated service work that is primarily undertaken by women and which involves the care of human bodies.
Four strategies of control were identified in the analysis.
The first was shifting the risks and responsibilities of doing business from the platform, to workers and clients. The terms of all platforms specifically disclaimed any employer-like relationship with carers, asserting they were an ‘intermediary service’, a ‘marketplace’, a ‘search facility provider’ or a ‘venue’. All care platforms denied responsibility for non-payments or delays in payments.
The second strategy of control was apportioning direct and indirect costs to workers and clients. Several platforms charged clients or carers for premium subscriptions. This may lead to the marginalization of vulnerable job-seekers who cannot afford to pay premium prices (De Stefano and Wouter, 2019).
Most platforms charged commissions and third-party processing fees before releasing client payments to carers. However, few provided details of pricing and payment structures. This may lead to workers registering with the platform without fully understanding the benefits they might receive in exchange for their work.
Terms stated that care workers and clients were responsible for all direct and indirect costs. Direct costs included internet access, data charges, transport, and registrations and licenses. Indirect costs included unpaid tasks including registering with the platform, managing an online profile, and uploading documentation such as qualifications, police checks and insurance.
The third strategy of control was dictating contractual arrangements associated with interactions between the worker and the platform, and workers and clients. Two platforms used ‘lock-in’ clauses that expressly prohibited carers from engaging in ‘multi-apping’, where a worker simultaneously engages with a competitor platform, or working for a client offline.
Terms advised that carers should create an individual agreement with each new client and to take responsibility for their own health and safety by inspecting premises and equipment on each occasion they arrived at a client’s home.
The fourth strategy of control was monitoring performance and quality standards of work. To create a profile, platforms required proof of qualifications and registrations for certain types of care work. However, several noted that while the company may verify credentials, they were not obliged to do so.
Our findings suggest that care work intermediaries, via these four control strategies, not only utilise but also extend techniques of power that can undermine labour rights and protections. The terms and conditions appear to lower the costs of labour and reduce earnings.
Overall, the study sheds new light on digitally intermediated work that is distinct from more transactional and impersonal on-demand work such as cleaning, maintenance or driving. With the rising demand for care associated with an ageing population, the study highlights the contours of such work in an increasingly important segment of the service sector.
Paula McDonald, Penny Williams and Robyn Mayes are the winners of this year’s SAGE Prize for Innovation and Excellence (Work, Employment & Society journal) for their paper, Means of Control in the Organization of Digitally Intermediated Care Work. This piece was first published in Everyday Society.
Article Details
Means of Control in the Organization of Digitally Intermediated Care Work
Paula McDonald, Penny Williams, Robyn Mayes, Robyn Mayes
First Published December 22, 2020
Work, Employment and Society
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