India–China and Their War-making Capacities
Much has been said about how China’s rapidly growing economy has led to increasing power disparity between India and China over the last two decades. China’s economic growth in this period has been spectacular, but it is not clear whether that gives a good sense of how effective its military capabilities are against India. Many argue that the growing power disparity favouring China explains China’s aggressive actions against India on the Line of Actual Control..
In this article, the following questions are asked: (a) What is the nature of India’s power disparity vis-à-vis China? (b) Does the existing power disparity give China a clear and uncontestable advantage? It is argued that while there is no doubt that there is a power disparity between India and China that favours the latter, the magnitude of such differentials varies depending on how material power is conceptualised. Furthermore, despite the presence of power disparity, there are geographical and strategic factors that mitigate the effects of power disparity to India’s advantage.
This study assesses the nature of power differentials between India and China using different conceptualisation and measures of war-making capacity and presents an assessment of whether the current power disparity gives an undisputed advantage to China or whether there are areas where India can compensate. China has an advantage in resources, the prevailing disparity is not significantly wide and India still has the chance to catch-up when it comes to closing the gap on certain variables of power. This study shows that, qualitatively, China still lags in terms of its naval capabilities, especially if it seeks to establish dominance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
This article is divided into three parts. First, discusses how military capacity has been defined and operationalised in the field of international relations. Second, the scope of power disparity based on critical variables related to war-making capacities such as military expenditures, military personnel, level of industrialisation, and measures of GDP and GDP per capita is discussed. Third, provides a qualitative assessment of the weapons platforms and troops’ battle preparedness. Finally the avenues for future research and make our concluding remarks.
In the event of a war with India, with the notable exception of Pakistan, Beijing would likely not find any allies in a confrontation with India. (Most states in the region would likely try to stay neutral). For its part, New Delhi can almost certainly depend on Washington to assist it in a conflict with China. For example, during the 2017 stand-off at Doklam, the Americans shared intelligence with India. Chinese maritime experts based in China are not as concerned with India on its own, but when coupled with the United States, their threat perceptions dramatically increase. With the signing of several foundational defence agreements between New Delhi and Washington that allow for logistical support and enhance interoperability,
For the past several decades, the prospect of a full-scale war between India and China has been a remote possibility. The violence during the summer of 2020 has resurrected concerns that the two Asian powers may engage in some form of kinetic confrontation beyond hand-to-hand combat with clubs and metal rods. Contrary to popular perceptions, if a mechanised conflict does breakout on either the disputed Himalayan border or in the Indian Ocean, India will be at a distinct advantage.
For the past several decades, the prospect of a full-scale war between India and China has been a remote possibility. The violence during the summer of 2020 has resurrected concerns that the two Asian powers may engage in some form of kinetic confrontation beyond hand-to-hand combat with clubs and metal rods. Contrary to popular perceptions, if a mechanised conflict does breakout on either the disputed Himalayan border or in the Indian Ocean, India will be at a distinct advantage.
A crucial challenge in the months and years ahead would be the willingness of the Chinese and Indian leaders to negotiating a satisfactory border settlement.
Article details:
India–China and Their War-making Capacities
Christopher K. Colley , Prashant Hosur Suhas
First Published February 28, 2021 Research Article
DOI:: 10.1177/2347797021993962
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs